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Abstract:   Most of Indonesia’s banking system collapsed during the 1997–98 
financial and economic crisis. We estimate that the net cost to taxpayers of the 
government’s blanket guarantee of banks’ liabilities, issued in February 1998, is 
about 40 per cent of annual GDP. Large banks fared worse in the crisis than small 
ones and state banks fared worse than private ones. Despite this, and despite the fact 
that bank capital turned out to have been inadequate, the government reduced the 
capital requirements for all banks, transferred the assets of closed banks, together 
with the lowest quality loans of those that were recapitalized, to a state-owned 
holding company, and thus excluded the private sector from participating in the 
process of liquidating these assets. The government offered to recapitalize several 
banks jointly with the private sector, but participation was restricted to the former 
owners, and even they could only participate on very unfavorable terms. As a result, 
too many banks were closed, too many nationalized and several were unnecessarily 
merged.  
We propose a more market oriented approach that would have strengthened banks 
by raising capital requirements and also minimized fiscal costs by auctioning those 
that failed to meet these requirements. In the case of insolvent banks, bidders should 
have been invited to submit tenders for taking over both their assets and liabilities. 
In all cases, bidders should have been able to choose between liquidating banks and 
keeping them operational, after injecting enough cash to meet the new capital 
adequacy requirements.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia’s banking sector was devastated by the crisis that began in October 1997. 
Of the largest banks—the seven original state banks and the ten largest formerly 
private banks—none managed to remain solvent, and those that still operate under 
their original names do so only because they were bailed out by the government.1  
The number of private banks was halved from 157 to 79: 65 were closed, 9 merged, 
and 4 nationalized (Table 1). Most of the assets of the banking sector are now 
controlled by the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), which was set up 
to manage nationalized banks as well as the assets that the government acquired 
when it took over the liabilities of insolvent banks as a result of a blanket guarantee 
to bank creditors issued in early 1998.  
The net cost to the government of bailing-out depositors will probably be at least 40 
per cent of annual GDP. The exact amount will depend on IBRA’s ability to collect 
doubtful debts and sell off its huge share portfolio. In order to amortize this cost 
over several years the government has issued a large volume of bonds, the value of 
which exceeds the total liabilities of the whole banking system at the time the 
guarantee was issued. Despite the resources that have been poured into the banking 
sector, however, its weakness continued to impede economic recovery as of mid 
2001.  
2. THE 1997–98 BANKING CRISIS 
The massive real depreciation of the rupiah in 1997–98, combined with the sharp rise in 
interest rates and the refusal of creditors to roll-over loans led to the insolvency of 
many Indonesian businesses and banks.2 At the beginning of November 1997, the 
Indonesian government entered into its first crisis support agreement with the IMF and 
simultaneously closed 16 small private banks that were experiencing liquidity 
problems and were seriously in breach of various prudential regulations. This 
exacerbated the public’s loss of confidence in the banking system because, in the 
absence of clearly stated criteria for closures and of information on the soundness of 
                                                 
1 Indonesia’s banks can be classified into five different ownership categories. State banks are owned 
by the central government, regional development banks (RDB) by the provincial governments, and 
private banks by the Indonesian private sector. Joint venture banks have both foreign and domestic 
banks as shareholders, and foreign banks are local branches of foreign institutions. 
2 Although the rupiah recovered much lost ground in late 1998, the rupiah price of the dollar 
remained nearly five times higher in mid 2001 than prior to the crisis. Interest rates had returned to 
pre-crisis levels by late 1999.  
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the remaining banks, there was great uncertainty about which banks might be closed 
next. At the time, the government guaranteed deposits in the closed banks only up to 
an amount of Rp20 million—then equivalent to about $6,000.  
Table 1: Bank mergers, closures and survivals 
 Initial Lost Remaining 
  Closed Merged Private 
& JV 
National
-ized 
State & 
regional 
State banks 7  3   4 
Regional development 
banks 
26     26 
Private banks 157 65 9 79 4  
Closed in 1997 16 16     
Nationalized in 1998 4  2  2  
Closed in 1998 10 10     
Audited in March 1999       
 Category A 73 1  72   
 Category B       
  Closed in March  
  1999 
21 21     
  Eligible for  
  recapitalization 
9   7 2  
  Nationalized   7  7a    
 Category C 17 17     
Joint venture banks  32 2  30   
Audited in March 1999       
 Category A 15   15   
 Category B 17 2  15   
Total 222 67 12 109 4 30 
 
a The seven private banks nationalized in 1999 were subsequently merged with Bank Danamon, 
which had already been nationalized in 1998. 
Several of the remaining private banks continued to experience liquidity problems in 
the last quarter of 1997, and Bank Indonesia (BI, the central bank) supplied them 
with large amounts of last resort loans. Late in January 1998 the government tried to 
restore confidence by issuing a blanket guarantee of all deposits and other liabilities 
(except equity and subordinated debt) at domestically incorporated banks. Although 
the government initially intended to terminate this guarantee at the end of January 
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2000, it now seems unlikely to do so before setting up a self-funded compulsory 
deposit insurance scheme, which is not expected to be introduced until 2004.  
In January 1998, IBRA was set up to perform three main roles. One is to oversee the 
restructuring or liquidation of weak banks so as to limit the fiscal costs of the 
government’s blanket guarantee. Its second role is that of a large state-owned banking 
conglomerate. It acquired this role because it had to take responsibility for the troubled 
private banks that the authorities took over, but did not close down. IBRA’s third role 
is that of an asset management company. It was given the task of managing the very 
low quality (‘category 5’) loans that, as described in section 3, the government stripped 
from all banks that were recapitalized. It also acquired the assets of the banks that were 
closed down, many of which were low quality loans. Lastly, it has acquired large, and 
often controlling, parcels of shares in some of Indonesia’s best known companies. 
This happened in two ways. First, in the banking panics of 1997–98 BI refused to 
provide emergency liquidity support unless bank owners deposited shares as 
collateral, or issued personal or corporate guarantees that their banks would repay. 
In the case of banks that failed, IBRA took over their liabilities to BI, along with the 
collateral and the guarantees that had secured them. Second, controlling 
shareholders in banks that had violated prudential regulations faced strong pressure 
to surrender shares to IBRA to avoid prosecution under the banking law of 1992, 
which contained very severe penalties in the form of lengthy terms of imprisonment 
and heavy fines for violations of the prudential regulations (McLeod 1992).  
Despite the blanket guarantee, several private banks continued to experience liquidity 
problems throughout the first half of 1998, in response to which BI provided large 
amounts of last resort loans. It became clear subsequently that some banks continued to 
make large loans to affiliated companies, which used them to repay foreign borrowings 
or to speculate against the rupiah. In April 1998 IBRA took over management control 
of six private banks and one state bank, and a further seven small private banks were 
closed. In May 1998 it had to take control of Bank Central Asia (BCA), then the 
largest of all the banks, in response to a severe run on its deposits. In August 1998, 
three of the private banks under IBRA’s control were closed, and the remaining four 
were effectively nationalized pending further action.  
3.  THE GOVERNMENT’S BANK RESTRUCTURING STRATEGY 
As the crisis deepened in mid 1998, it became apparent that a policy of closing down 
all insolvent banks would wipe out a large proportion of the entire banking sector. 
The government and the IMF therefore drew up plans for recapitalizing some of the 
insolvent banks and merging or closing down the rest. These plans appear to have 
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been strongly influenced by those adopted by Sweden to resolve its 1991–94 banking 
crisis (Ingves and Lind, 1997). 
All seven state banks had to be recapitalized. Four of them were merged to form 
Bank Mandiri, which became Indonesia’s largest bank, with 30 per cent of all bank 
deposits. The three remaining state banks were recapitalized separately.3  
In the case of insolvent, or under-capitalized, private and joint venture banks, the 
government had to choose between immediate sale to a strategic investor, 
liquidation, and partial or full nationalization.4 Its first step was to arrange for all the 
surviving non state-owned banks to be audited by a group of internationally reputed 
accounting firms, which estimated the amount of capital needed to recapitalize each 
bank and sorted them into three categories:  
• Category A: those that did not need to be recapitalized; 
• Category B: those deemed to be potentially worth saving, but in need of 
recapitalization;  
• Category C: those that were to be liquidated.  
At the onset of the crisis, the government was in the process of raising the minimum 
CAR from 8 per cent, which is the norm for industrialized countries under the Basle 
Capital Accord (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc002.htm). By September 1997, the 
specified minimum was already 9 per cent, and this was scheduled to increase to 10 
per cent by September 1999 and to 12 per cent by September 2001. In the event, in 
order to reduce the amount of new equity needed to recapitalize the banks, the CAR 
was instead reduced to only 4 per cent in February 1999. Although the government 
announced that the former 8 per cent minimum would again apply with effect from 
the end of 2001, it has not proposed the reinstatement of the more ambitious 12 per 
cent target. The cut-off points between the categories were then set in terms of the 
                                                 
3 One of these, Bank BNI, is actually a publicly listed company with significant (but not majority) 
private sector ownership. Nevertheless it is still classified as a ‘state bank’ in the official banking 
statistics. A new state-owned export credit agency, Bank Export Indonesia, was established in August 
1999, but it is not strictly a ‘bank’, since it is not licensed to accept deposits from the public (Jakarta 
Post, 27 November 2000). 
4 A prerequisite for minimizing the government’s losses under any of these alternatives was to ensure 
that the legal environment provided creditors with remedies sufficient to deter default by those 
capable of repaying loans. Despite its efforts to establish effective bankruptcy courts, however, the 
government has not yet managed to provide such an environment (Lindsey 1998, 2000). 
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CAR estimated by the auditors. Category A banks were defined to be those with a 
CAR above the new minimum of 4 per cent, and the category C banks were those 
with a CAR of less than minus 25 per cent. Those potentially eligible to participate 
with the government in recapitalization (the category B banks) were those with a 
CAR of less than 4 per cent but more than minus 25 per cent. In the remainder of this 
section we deal only with these category B banks. In the event, none of them had a 
positive estimated CAR. Subordinated debt in these banks was therefore written off. 
Provided that their managers and principal shareholders passed the central bank’s ‘fit 
and proper test’, and that they were able to propose an acceptable business plan, the 
private shareholders of category B banks could choose whether or not to participate in 
recapitalization. If they chose not to participate, their banks were nationalized and 
they received nothing in return. If instead they wished to preserve an interest in 
their banks, they had to supply cash equal to at least 20 per cent of the capital 
needed to raise the CAR to 4 per cent. The remaining amount was to be supplied by 
the government in the form of newly issued bonds.  
By way of illustration, consider a bank with deposits of Rp340 billion, and total 
assets (loans, cash and other securities etc.) valued by the auditors at Rp250 billion, 
implying negative equity of Rp90 billion. On the assumption that cash and 
government securities, which have a zero risk weight,5 were a negligible part of total 
assets, a capital injection of Rp100 billion would have been needed to raise the CAR 
to 4 per cent. Under the government’s bank recapitalization plan, the private 
shareholders would have had to contribute at least Rp20 billion in cash if they 
wished to participate, while the government would have contributed up to Rp80 
billion in bonds. Following recapitalization, and assuming that the private 
shareholders had not contributed more than the minimum necessary, the bank’s 
balance sheet would have been as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Balance sheet of hypothetical recapitalized bank 
(Rp billion) 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans and other risky assets 250 Deposits 340 
Government bonds 80 Government equity 8  
Cash 20 Private equity 2  
                                                 
5 The CAR is the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets: the weights attaching to each asset category 
depend on its level of risk. For present purposes, the most important categories are loans, which have 
a 100 per cent weighting, and cash and government securities, which have a zero weighting. 
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  Total equity 10 
 
Of the Rp10 billion of equity (at book value), Rp8 billion would have been held by 
the government and Rp2 billion by the private shareholders. Therefore if the bank’s 
risky assets turned out to be worth the Rp250 billion estimated by the auditors, the 
private shareholders would have voluntarily contributed Rp20 billion in cash to 
acquire shares worth only Rp2 billion. Three things could have induced them to 
accept such an apparently unattractive offer: first, the auditors may have 
underestimated the value of risky assets; second, the original owners stood to obtain 
most of the proceeds of category 5 loans—the most severely impaired loans, which 
were stripped from banks in the process of their recapitalization—if and only if they 
participated in recapitalization; and third, in addition to their own new shares, 
private owners who participated in recapitalization also received call options over 
the government’s shares.  
The model set out below is used to analyze these possibilities. We focus on two time 
periods, indicated by the subscript t: period 0, which is immediately after 
recapitalization, and period 1, which is the exercise date of the options issued by the 
government at the time of recapitalization. Throughout the following discussion, 
when writing the period 1 value of any variable we discount it back to its present 
value in period 0.  
The bank’s balance sheet identity is: 
 At + B + C ≡  D + Et t = 0, 1 (1) 
where A is the value of original assets, B is the value of new capital injected (in the 
form of bonds ) by the government at the time of recapitalization, C is the value of 
new capital injected (in the form of cash) by the original owners at this time, D is the 
value of original deposits, and E is the corresponding implied value of equity. 
Initially, we focus on the role of the call options and abstract from new deposits and 
new lending; we also assume that cash yields liquidity services at a rate equal to the 
interest rate on bonds, loans and deposits. Under these simplifying assumptions, B, 
C and D remain unchanged between periods 0 and 1 and their time subscripts are 
therefore omitted. We begin by also assuming that the value of category 5 loans is 
negligible. Under these assumptions, all that happens between period 0 and 1 is that 
uncertainty about the true value of the bank’s assets is partially resolved. This 
focuses attention on the incentives created by the call options. These assumptions are 
relaxed step by step in the remainder of this section.  
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No new loans or deposits, category 5 loans assumed to be worthless  
The options over its own shares that the government gave to private investors who 
participated in recapitalization led to the creation of two distinct types of share, in 
addition to the shares belonging to the original owners before recapitalization. In 
total there were therefore three types: 
• Series A shares were those already issued prior to the crisis;  
• Series B shares were issued to the original owners at the time of recapitalization;  
• Series C shares were issued to the government at the time of recapitalization. 
The number of options issued by the government was equal to the number of series 
C shares it acquired. These options were given to the original owners in proportion 
to the number of series B shares they took up. The date at which the options could be 
exercised was set three years after the date of recapitalization, and the exercise price 
was the issue price of the shares plus accumulated interest over this three year 
period.  
In the event, there were no banks with an estimated CAR between 0 and 4 per cent, 
so we need only to consider banks whose estimated CAR was negative. In these 
cases, the total number of new shares was set at 100 times the number of series A 
shares already in existence prior to recapitalization, and the issue price of series B 
and C shares was calculated to ensure that the value of new equity injected into each 
bank was enough to raise its CAR to 4 per cent, given the auditors’ estimate of the 
value and average risk-weight of its existing assets.6 Since the series A shares were 
reduced to a negligible share of the total, we ignore them from now onwards. We 
also normalize the issue price at unity, so that (B + C) denotes  the number of new 
shares issued.  
The newly injected capital was in the form of government bonds and cash, which 
have a zero risk weight. Given the 4 per cent CAR, the minimum required equity is 
0.04A0 and the total amount of new capital required is therefore given by: 
 B + C = D – (1 – 0.04)A0 = D – 0.96A0 (2) 
                                                 
6 For simplicity, we assume that all of the bank’s assets prior to recapitalization carried a 100 per cent 
weighting—that is, that the average risk-weight was 100 per cent. 
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where A0 is the auditors’ estimate of the value of the assets held immediately prior to 
recapitalization—in other words, their estimate of the present value in period 0 of 
what the market value of these assets would turn out to be in period 1. 
The incentives created by the recapitalization arrangements can be understood by 
deriving an equation for the net profit or loss made by the original owners as a result 
of participating in recapitalization. We denote the ex post amounts of the net losses to 
private shareholders and the government by LP and LG, respectively. E1 is the market 
capitalization of the bank in period 1—that is, the share price, q1, multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding, and A1 is the implied market valuation of the bank’s 
risky assets in period 1, given the known values of its deposits, bonds and cash. 
Since we have abstracted from new lending and new deposit taking between periods 
0 and 1, A1 is the realized market value in period 1 of the assets held in period 0. The 
aggregate net cost to private shareholders and the government of recapitalizing the 
banks, denoted by L, is the amount of capital injected minus the market value of the 
equity that the government and private investors end up with: 
 L = LP + LG = B + C – E1. (3) 
Under the assumptions of this subsection, B, C and D are all constant between 
periods 0 and 1. Therefore, by replacing the value of equity, E1, with the product of 
the share price, q1, and the number of shares issued, (B + C), and using the balance 
sheet identity (1) for period 1, equation (3) may be written as: 
 L = (1 – q1).(B + C) = D – A1. (4) 
The term (1 – q1)(B + C) measures the excess of the total amount of capital injected in 
period 0, at an issue price of unity, over the market value of the shares in period 1, 
when the share price is q1. The term D – A1 measures the extent to which deposits 
exceed the realized value in period 1 of the initial assets—that is, the amount by 
which the bank turns out to have been insolvent before it was recapitalized, as 
distinct from the auditor’s original estimate, D – A0, of this amount. 
Equation (4) has a simple rationale: the net cost of recapitalizing an insolvent firm is 
the amount of capital that has to be injected to raise the value of equity from 
something negative to zero. As long as capital earns a normal rate of return, there is 
no cost to the original owners and the government of raising equity from zero to any 
positive level. 
The incentives created by the call options given to the original owners can be 
clarified by considering the following two cases: 
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Case I. Suppose that q1, the present value of the period 1 share price, turns out to be 
less than the issue price. In this case, the private shareholders would not exercise 
their options. The total cost to them of participating in recapitalization would turn 
out to be their share in the amount of new capital injected, multiplied by the total net 
cost of recapitalization, L. Both the government and the private shareholders clearly 
lose in this case: their shares fall in value below their issue price, and the options 
have no effect, ex post, because they are not exercised. Therefore in case I, L > 0. 
Because the private shareholders contribute a fraction, say α, of the capital injected 
and receive the same share of the final value of equity, their loss is also the same 
fraction of the total net cost of recapitalization: 
 LP = α L and LG  = (1 - α) L, when L > 0. (5) 
Case II. Now suppose that the present value of the period 1 share price turns out to 
exceed the issue price. In this case, the private shareholders would exercise their 
options to buy the government’s shares and would clearly gain from having 
participated in recapitalization: their shares increase in value and their call options 
are in the money. It is also clear that the government just breaks even: when the 
options are called, it resells its shares at their issue price, plus accumulated interest. 
The private sector loss is therefore equal to the total net cost of recapitalizing the 
banks (and both are negative):  
 LP = L and LG  = 0, when L ≤ 0.  (6)                      
The two cases can be summed up as follows. In the case of a bank that turns out to 
have been insolvent (L > 0), original owners who choose to participate in 
recapitalization end up sharing the cost of bailing out depositors with the 
government in proportion to their share α in the newly injected equity. In the case of 
a bank that turns out not to have been insolvent (L ≤ 0), private shareholders who 
participate in recapitalization end up by recouping the full amount of the ex post 
value of the bank’s positive equity (– L = A1 - D > 0), and the government just breaks 
even. 
It follows from this that it would not have been sensible for the original owners to 
participate unless they felt there was a very good chance that their bank was merely 
illiquid and not really insolvent. Given the parlous state of Indonesian banks in 1999 
it is unlikely that there were many category B banks in this condition. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that most banks were taken over and recapitalized by the 
government alone or closed down. One result was excessive government 
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involvement in the recapitalized banking sector; another was that many banks were 
needlessly shut down whereas, as we argue in the final section, they should have 
been sold as going concerns. 
Category 5 loans 
As part of the auditing process, the most severely impaired non-performing loans 
were stripped from every recapitalized bank and transferred to IBRA. If the owners 
chose not to participate in recapitalization, the proceeds of these category 5 loans 
will go to the government. However, if the owners did participate, they would be 
nominally entitled to the entire proceeds of category 5 loans, net of collection costs, 
but would be required to use the full amount to exercise some or all of their call 
options. If the call options are in the money they will be exercised anyway, but if the 
share price in period 1 turns out to be, say, 10 per cent below the exercise price of the 
options, the private shareholders will actually gain only Rp90 for every Rp100 of 
category 5 loans recovered, because to receive this amount of category 5 loans they 
will have to exercise options to pay Rp100 for shares worth only Rp90. 
The treatment of category 5 loans does not alter the conclusion of the preceding 
subsection that private shareholders only benefit from participation if the bank’s 
assets, now defined to include category 5 loans, turn out to exceed the value of 
deposits. The essential difference between category 5 loans and other assets is that if 
the share price in period 1 turns out to be not much less than the initial issue price, 
so that private participants in recapitalization only just fail to break even, they will 
gain almost 100 percent of recoveries of category 5 loans, whereas they will gain only 
20 percent of recoveries of other assets if they contribute only 20 percent of the new 
capital needed to recapitalize the bank. A possible rationale for giving private 
shareholders a much higher share in the net proceeds of category 5 loans than in the 
proceeds from other loans is that most of the category 5 loans may be the result of 
within-group lending. Repayment of such loans is partly at the discretion of the 
owners of the conglomerates that controlled both the banks and the entities to which 
they lent; they would have little incentive to exercise that discretion under the 
implied ‘tax rate’ of 80 per cent.  
New lending: recapitalization and moral hazard 
In this subsection we relax the assumption that banks do not undertake any new 
lending and deposit-taking, and investigate the influence of the recapitalization 
arrangements on the choice of projects that they lend to. It is well known that, like 
deposit insurance, government guarantees create moral hazard. The smaller a bank’s 
capital, the greater is the incentive for its owners to lend guaranteed deposits to 
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finance risky projects undertaken either by firms in the same group, or by unrelated 
firms (provided that the lending rates are appropriately high): if the projects 
succeed, the bank’s owners make profits that are not shared with the government; 
but if they fail badly, the government shares in the loss. The smaller the bank’s 
original equity, the bigger the government’s share in the loss. Setting a minimum 
CAR mitigates this problem by making the owners of banks put at least some of 
their own equity at risk, as a buffer between the uncertain value of assets and the 
deposit liabilities guaranteed by the government.  
Four features of Indonesia’s recapitalization arrangements exacerbated the problem 
of moral hazard. First, the minimum CAR for all banks was lowered from 9 per cent 
to 4 per cent. Even a 9 per cent CAR implies an extremely high ratio of debt 
(deposits) to equity by comparison with what is regarded as acceptable in the non-
financial corporate sector, and almost guarantees that moral hazard will be a serious 
problem in developing countries, where financial skills are lacking, legal systems 
weak, and economic fluctuations relatively large (Fane and McLeod, 1999: 408–9). 
This new CAR requirement was relaxed even further in June 2000 by allowing banks 
to include their loan loss reserves in measured capital (Jakarta Post, 16 June 2000), 
despite the fact that loss reserves are an estimate of losses the banks expect to 
incur—whereas ‘capital’ for the purpose of calculating the CAR is supposed to be 
available to meet unexpected future losses. 
Second, the minimum CAR following recapitalization was really less than 4 per cent, 
because the banks were allowed—‘required’ is perhaps more accurate—to value the 
government bonds issued to recapitalize them at their nominal value, which 
substantially overstated their true value because they carried below-market interest 
yields (McLeod 2000: 27–9). When capital is low, any overvaluation of assets has a 
strongly magnified effect on capital; for example, in the numerical example in Table 
2, a 10 per cent reduction in the estimated value of government bonds would reduce 
the estimated value of equity by 80 per cent. 
Third, the fact that the private shareholders have call options over the government’s 
shares provides them with a further incentive to gamble. If risky investments 
succeed, the call options will be in the money and the benefits will accrue to the 
private owners, whereas if they fail, the government will share in the losses. The 
moral hazard induced by the call options is all the greater because the government 
owns most of the shares in recapitalized banks and has issued call options over all of 
them.  
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Fourth, since up to 80 per cent of the capital in the jointly recapitalized banks may be 
owned by the government, the 4 per cent CAR greatly exaggerates the capital staked 
by the private owners, who continue to control the management of the bank. It is 
clearly only the risk of losing their own capital that can help deter private owners 
from using government guaranteed deposits to finance excessively risky projects. 
The minimum ratio of private capital to risk-weighted assets, which is the measure 
relevant to limiting moral hazard, was reduced from 9 percent to just 0.8 per cent.7 
4. THE COST OF RECAPITALISING THE BANKS 
In its Letter of Intent to the IMF in April 1998, the government estimated that the 
value of government bonds needed to recapitalize banks to an 8 per cent CAR would 
be about 15 per cent of GDP. A major component of this total was the repayment of 
the liquidity support provided by BI to banks subsequently taken over by IBRA. In 
the event, the banks were recapitalized to a CAR of only 4 per cent, and both the cost 
and the time taken will be very much greater than originally estimated: by December 
2000, the total amount of bonds that had been issued for this purpose had already 
reached Rp644 trillion (Table 3), which is equivalent to 58 per cent of GDP for 1999. 
Table 3: Government bonds needed to recapitalize the banks 
 Private State/RDB Total 
Variable nominal interest rate bonds 288.4 176.0 464.4 
 Inflation-indexed (Bank Indonesia) 198.3 20.0 218.3 
 Interest rate linked to SBI rate 90.1 129.4 219.5 
 Dollar-indexed (‘hedge’) bonds  0.0 26.6 26.6 
Fixed nominal interest rate bonds 51.9 127.5 179.4 
Total government bonds  340.3 303.5 643.8 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (unpublished); IBRA (unpublished). 
Some of the recapitalization bonds have a fixed nominal interest rate, others have 
variable nominal rates. The government originally announced that variable interest 
bonds would be used to restore banks’ equity to zero, and fixed interest rate bonds 
would be used to raise their CAR from zero to 4 per cent.8 On this basis, Table 3 
                                                 
7 This is calculated as the product of the 20 percent minimum private share in total capital and the 
minimum total CAR of 4 per cent. 
8 Besides deposits, the liabilities of failed banks included Rp164.5 trillion of last resort loans from BI. 
The government also owed BI Rp53.8 trillion for temporary cover of the blanket guarantee. The 
government paid off BI for both these types of claim by issuing it with Rp218.3 trillion of variable 
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implies that the net fiscal cost of the bail-out would be the Rp464 trillion of variable 
interest rate bonds issued, minus whatever IBRA can recover from disposing of its 
asset portfolio. However, this is an underestimate, both because IBRA’s expected 
recoveries include those from category 5 loans, some of which will accrue to private 
shareholders, and also because some of the fixed rate bonds were in fact used to 
restore banks’ capital to zero.9 
In mid 2000, IBRA controlled assets with a book value of about Rp383 trillion 
(excluding its shares in nationalized and jointly recapitalized banks) 
(Feridhanusetyawan 2000: 12). Of this total, about Rp289 trillion comprised loans 
and other assets transferred to it from banks, while the remainder, Rp94 trillion, 
comprised shares acquired through shareholder settlements.10 The recovery rate on 
these assets is estimated by IBRA to be of the order of one third to one half, so total 
recoveries should be of the order of Rp150 trillion, which is equivalent to Rp100 
trillion in present value terms.11 Subtracting this from the Rp484 trillion of variable 
bonds issued, implies an ultimate net fiscal cost of Rp384 trillion—about 40 per cent 
of 1998 GDP, or roughly $40 billion at the September 2001 exchange rate of around 
Rp9,500/$.  
5. RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF STATE AND PRIVATE AND OF LARGE AND SMALL BANKS 
State banks and private banks 
Table 3 implies that the gross costs to the government for bailing out the private and 
government banks, as indicated by the value of variable interest rate bonds issued, 
are Rp288 trillion and Rp176 trillion, respectively. But the private banks initially held 
far more deposits than the government banks (Rp183 trillion compared with Rp100 
trillion in June 1997); as a cost per unit of deposits, the ratios are 1.57 and 1.76, 
respectively. The ultimate bail-out cost to the government per initial unit of deposits 
will probably be significantly higher for state banks than for private banks than these 
                                                                                                                                                        
interest rate bonds with a nominal interest rate 3 per cent higher than the CPI inflation rate. These 
bonds are included in the Rp464.4 trillion of variable rate bonds issued in total. See Table 3.  
9 Pangestu and Goeltom (2001: 168, 171). 
10 See end of section 2. IBRA has recently been pushing for a new round of agreements with former 
controlling shareholders in which it hopes that additional assets will be given over. If the political will 
were sufficiently strong, the overall cost to the government of the bail-out could probably be 
significantly reduced by this approach. 
11 The present value of Rp100 in cash recoveries in three years’ time, discounted at, say, 14 per cent 
per annum, is about Rp67. 
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ratios suggest, for two reasons. First, IBRA expects the recovery rate on loans and 
other assets transferred from failed private banks to be much higher than for those 
taken over from state banks; and second, by taking over collateral on failed last 
resort loans, as mentioned in section 2, IBRA has acquired ownership or control of a 
large volume of assets of major shareholders of many of the failed or jointly 
recapitalized private banks (a possibility that does not arise in the case of the state-
owned banks), the sale of which augments recoveries overall. 
Large banks and small banks 
The policy of the government and the IMF has been to consolidate the banking 
sector by forced mergers, rather than allowing market forces to determine its size 
structure. The apparent belief of the government and the IMF that bigger is better is 
not supported by recent experience, however. All of the large private banks were 
brought down by the crisis, whereas the smaller ones have fared much better, on 
average. This is clear from market share data on particular groups of banks.12 The 73 
private banks that were classified in March 1999 as category A (not needing further 
immediate action in relation to capital adequacy) had an average market share of 
0.07% each, whereas the other 84 in existence just prior to the crisis (which have all 
been either closed, nationalized, or jointly recapitalized) were more than seven times 
larger, with an average market share of 0.50% each.  
Average market share data are also available for a number of sub-groups of these 84 
troubled banks. Amongst those closed, the first 16 (closed in October 1997) had an 
average market share of 0.16% each; the next 7 (April 1998) had 0.06%; the next 3 
(August 1998) had 1.60%; and the last 38 (March 1999) had 0.13%. Of those 
nationalized, 4 (April  and May 1998)  had an average market share of 3.78%, and 7 
(March 1999) had 0.36%. Finally, the 9 banks listed as eligible for joint 
recapitalization in March 1999 had an average market share of 1.33%. In short, of all 
these troubled institutions, only one small sub-group of 7 banks was of similar size 
to the 73 that did not require immediate remedial action; all the others were 
considerably larger. 
A possible explanation for the relatively worse performance of the large banks is that 
banks that believed they were ‘too large to be allowed to fail’ were more willing and 
                                                 
12 These data are derived from Government of Indonesia (1999: paragraphs 27-31) and Enoch et al. 
(2001: Appendix 1). The term ‘market share’ is used a little loosely here, as the first source reports 
shares of deposits, while the latter reports shares of liabilities (presumably, net of shareholders’ 
funds).  
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able to undertake excessively risky investments than small banks that could be 
liquidated with little risk of a political backlash. 
6. OVERVIEW AND POLICY APPRAISAL 
As a percentage of GDP, the amount of government bonds needed to recapitalize the 
banks is more than four times the proportion initially estimated, and the net fiscal 
cost of bailing out the banks will probably be about a third of annual GDP—and 
about four times larger than the total amount that had been lent to Indonesia by the 
IMF by mid 2001. The herd behavior of investors following the collapse of the Thai 
baht in July 1997 contributed to the timing of this disaster, but its main cause was 
that Indonesian banks flouted the prudential regulations on within-group lending 
and had far too little capital, given that their assets were not globally diversified and 
that the weak and corrupt domestic legal system provides little protection for 
creditors. In section 5 we showed that small banks performed far less badly than 
large ones during the crisis, and that private banks fared less badly than state banks. 
In view of all this, it is highly paradoxical that the restructuring plan devised by the 
IMF and the government reduced capital requirements, nationalized many banks 
and forced mergers among several of the banks that survived.  
We believe that the fiscal cost of meeting the government’s blanket guarantee could 
have been reduced, while strengthening the banking sector and reducing moral 
hazard to acceptable levels, if, instead of devising a special bank recapitalization 
plan, the government had dealt with the general banking sector collapse by 
following the prudential rules that would be appropriate for dealing with the actual 
or incipient insolvency of a single bank in otherwise normal circumstances.13 
 We subscribe to the arguments advanced by Kaufman (1994) and others that these 
rules should be based on setting a high level of the ‘minimum normally acceptable 
CAR’, henceforth the ‘minimum CAR’. For banks that satisfy this minimum capital 
requirement, regulation should be limited to making sure that the CAR is correctly 
reported; but those that do not meet the minimum CAR should be subject to 
constraints, monitoring regimes and penalties that become progressively more strict, 
the greater the extent to which the CAR is below the minimum. These rules should 
also set out the procedures for dealing with banks that are insolvent, or nearly 
insolvent. The time allowed for banks to restore the CAR to the minimum level 
should be shorter, the further the bank’s CAR is below the minimum: the bigger the 
                                                 
13 Our rationalisation for some prudential regulation is the familiar argument that few governments, 
if any, can resist the political pressures to bail out banks when a panic occurs. 
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problem, the more urgent should be the required response. In a crisis, it is 
particularly important that these graduated responses to loss of capital should be 
followed, and not replaced by a once-off restructuring plan.  
Our rationalization for some minimum capital requirement is to limit the moral 
hazard created by explicit deposit insurance or implicit government guarantees. 
Dowd (1999) notes that this does not establish that the result is better than laissez-
faire. The trouble with announcing a laissez-faire policy of never bailing out banks—
as the Indonesian government did repeatedly before the crisis—is that it is seldom, if 
ever, credible: everyone is likely to believe that as soon as a crisis occurs the 
government will cave in to the political pressures to issue a deposit guarantee, as 
happened in Indonesia in February 1998. Only a constitutional guarantee could 
make laissez-faire credible, and even that might well be inadequate, given the ease 
with which supreme courts can find ways around constitutional constraints when it 
is politically expedient to do so (Fane, 1998).  
In our view, the minimum CAR should always have been at least 16 per cent. 
Instead of reducing it to 4 per cent, the government should have kept to its earlier 
plan (see section 3) under which it was to rise gradually to 12 per cent by September 
2001, but added a further increase to 16 per cent by, perhaps, September 2002. 
Similarly, banks that failed to meet the minimum CAR should always have been 
subject to corrective action provisions that were not biased against private sector 
participation in bank recapitalization, and that relied on market tests, rather than on 
arbitrary rules, to decide whether they should be liquidated, merged, or 
recapitalized.  
Following the valuation of the banks by outside auditors, government supervisors 
should have been appointed on a full time basis to monitor banks that just failed to 
meet the minimum CAR, and administrators should have been appointed to take 
over the management of those banks that were almost, or actually, insolvent. The 
owners of a bank that was solvent, but that failed to meet the minimum CAR, should 
have been given perhaps three months to devise a plan to raise the necessary capital 
and a further three months in which to do so. The owners of a bank with negative 
estimated equity, or of one that was unable or unwilling to meet the minimum CAR 
by the specified date, should have had their bank compulsorily sold at auction (as 
provided for in Law 7/1992 on Banking as amended in 1998), and been paid the net 
proceeds from the sale, if any.  
 Once the government had decided to sell a bank, a period of three to six months 
should have been allowed before the sale, in order to seek out potential buyers and 
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give them time to conduct due diligence checks. Rather than participation in 
recapitalization being restricted to the former owners, the auctions should have been 
widely advertised and all potential foreign and domestic investors, including the 
former owners, should have been eligible to bid, subject to passing a test of probity 
and competence. Under our proposal, all buyers would have been required to 
specify whether they planned to operate the bank as a going concern, or to liquidate 
it. In the former case, they would have had to inject enough new equity in the form 
of cash to raise the CAR to the minimum level upon acquisition. Continuing 
enforcement of the minimum CAR would have prevented the stripping of assets 
from recapitalized banks by their new owners. 
Reserve prices should have been set, but at levels substantially below the auditors’ 
valuations so as to lessen the probability of ownership of the banks falling into the 
government’s hands. One reason for wanting to avoid continuing government 
ownership is to avoid political interference in the operation, or liquidation, of 
banks.14 A second reason is that government officials do not have the same strong 
incentives to make a success of bank operation or liquidation as would private sector 
entities with their own capital at stake. These are the likely explanations for the fact 
that reviews of the state banks by international accounting firms in 1998 found that 
they ‘were all deeply insolvent’ (Enoch et al. 2001: 61). The poor performance of state 
banks was not a new phenomenon.15 Given this, it was ironic that the government 
brought in state bank managers to run the large private banks taken over by IBRA in 
April 1998. The result was that ‘most had to be replaced in the following months’ 
(Enoch et al. 2001: 76). 
Likewise IBRA, as a huge state-owned holding company, has proven vulnerable to 
outside pressures and has had insufficient incentives to make much progress. It has 
been strongly criticized for ‘being slow in starting major asset disposals … Sales 
were far slower than, say, in Korea or in Thailand’ (Enoch et al. 2001: 81–2). At end-
1999, the intention had been to sell BCA and two other banks by mid 2000, while 
Bank Danamon (into which 7 small banks taken over by IBRA had been merged) 
was to be sold in 2001; by this stage IBRA was to have divested itself of all its banks. 
                                                 
14 Enoch et al. (2001: 59–60) note, for example, that the state-owned Exim Bank lost about Rp 20 trillion 
($2.1 billion at an exchange rate of Rp 9,500/$) in the foreign exchange market, possibly (and very 
plausibly, in our view) as a result of the authorities using it in a failed attempt to support the rupiah. 
15 McLeod (1997: 281) briefly documents the state banks’ history of often having to be saved from 
bankruptcy by injections of capital by the government. Enoch et al. (2001: 60) also mention that the 
state-owned Bank BNI ‘had been recapitalized repeatedly over the previous 20 years’. 
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In the event, by late 2001 less than one third of BCA had been sold, and the 
divestment of Danamon was not in sight. IBRA’s performance in relation to loan 
recoveries and the divestment of companies under its control has been no more 
satisfactory. 
In the case of a bank whose value as estimated by bidders was negative, the auction 
would have been equivalent to the government calling for tenders to take over the 
assets and liabilities (other than equity and subordinated debt). These banks would 
not necessarily have been liquidated. As in the case of solvent banks, this decision 
would be left to the successful bidder, subject to the requirement that if the bank 
were to continue to operate, new equity sufficient to bring the CAR up to the 
minimum level would have had to be injected immediately upon acquisition. In 
cases in which the government had to pay new owners or liquidators to take over 
insolvent banks, it would have paid in cash, but sold enough bonds to prevent the 
bank bail-out resulting in excessive money creation.  
Subject to all banks having to meet the CAR requirement, the sale of banks to the 
highest bidder would have minimized the cost of meeting the government’s blanket 
guarantee by realizing the full value of firm-specific investments that are wasted if 
banks are needlessly liquidated. Examples of such investments include much of the 
on-the-job experience of bank personnel, much of the cost of management 
information systems and other software developed in-house, investments in 
building up branch networks other than those that can be recovered by the sale of 
the buildings themselves, and investments in advertising and brand name 
promotion to capture market share for both loans and deposits. Even in cases in 
which liquidation was the appropriate outcome, our proposal would have had the 
great advantage of being carried out quickly and by the private sector.  
The government’s blanket guarantee created a liability to creditors of insolvent 
banks that it could not avoid by liquidations or nationalizations. Under our 
proposed approach, market tests rather than bureaucratic rules would have decided 
which banks should have been liquidated and which were worth keeping in 
operation, and the government would have avoided unnecessarily taking over the 
ownership of many of the banks that were not liquidated. The responsibility for 
managing category 5 loans in private banks would have stayed with the private 
sector. The government would have sold bail-out bonds in the open market, rather 
than injecting them into the banks at unilaterally determined, artificially low interest 
rates. Recapitalized banks would have been financially stronger and less subject to 
moral hazard problems because they would not have ended up with overvalued 
bonds and correspondingly overstated equity. 
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The actual recapitalization arrangements exacerbated the problem of moral hazard 
by reducing the CAR. This policy may have been adopted partly to minimize the 
amount of bonds needed to recapitalize the banks and partly to avoid a possible 
credit squeeze. If the first factor was relevant, it should not have been, because the 
net fiscal cost of meeting the 1997–98 collapse was independent of whether banks 
were recapitalized to a CAR of 4 per cent, 8 per cent or 16 per cent. Setting too low a 
CAR merely increased the likelihood of another collapse, thus raising rather than 
lowering the likely ultimate net fiscal cost. We also reject the second factor, because 
providing banks with incentives to use guaranteed deposits to finance excessively 
risky projects is not a sensible way to counter the risk of a credit squeeze, even if 
such a risk existed. 
The actual arrangements also needlessly raised the net fiscal cost of the blanket 
guarantee in several ways. The right to participate in the recapitalization of a bank as 
an ongoing private concern was restricted to its former owners. The requirement 
that these former owners had to bear the full cost of previously accumulated losses 
before they could earn any net profit from their new investments further inhibited 
private sector participation in recapitalization. The most severely impaired loans 
were compulsorily shifted to the public sector, and only IBRA was allowed to 
undertake liquidations. As a result, too many banks were nationalized, too many 
were merged, too many were liquidated and liquidations were done by the public 
sector, not the private sector.  
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